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GENTLEMEN: There is submitted herewith the report of the special committee on the nomen-
clature, subdivision, and classification of aircraft accidents organized in pursuance of resolution
adopted by the executive committee on March 1, 1928. Attention is invited to the committee’s
recommendations at the end of its report.
Respectfully,
SPEWAL COMMITTEE ON THII NOMENCLATURE; SUBDIVISION,
AND CLASSIFICLTIOIJ OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
GEORGE K. BURGESS, (%airfiam
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REPORT No. 308
AJRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Report Prepared by
SpeciaI Committee on the Nomenclature,
Subdivision, and Classificationof Aircraft Accidents
INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE .&JJ OF? GAXIZATIOX
This report on a method of analysis of aircraf~ accidents has been prepared by a special
committee on the nomenclature, subdkision, aad classification of aircraft. accidents organized
by the NTational Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in response to a request dated February
18, 1928, from the air coordination committee consisting of the Assistant Secretaries for .Aero-
nautics in the Departments of War, NTavy, and Commerce. The work was undertaken in recog-
nition of the difEculty of drawing correct conclusions from efforts to analyze tmd compare reports
of aimraf t accidents prepared by different organizations using diflerent classifications and
definitions. The air coordination committee’s request -was made “in order that practices used
may henceforth conform to a standard and be uni~ersally comparable.” The purpose of the
special committee therefore was to prepare a basis for the classification and comparison of air-
craft accidents, both cid and military.
The special committee w-asorganized in pursuance of resolution adopted by the executi~e
committee of the N’ational Advisory Committee for Aeronautics on March 1, 1928, and heId
its initiaI meeting on If arch 19, 1928. Sixteen meetiugs -were held, the last being on July 17,
1928.
Following is the organization of the committee:
Representatives of the .Zi’ationalAdrisory (lommittee for Aeronautics:
Dr. George K. Burgess, chairman.
Mr. George W. Lewis.
Representatives of the Army A<r Corps:
Lieui. D. B. Phillips, United States Army.
Lieut. J. D. Barker, United States Army.
Representaiires oj the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Naty:
Tieut. Commander L. C- Ste-rens, Construction Corps, United States Navy-
Lieut, Charles R. Brow-n, United States Navy.
Representatives oj the Aeronautics Branch of the Department of Commerce:
Xfr. Daniel deR. Searritt (succeeded by Mr. Edward P. Howard).
Mr. Lester T. Bradbury.
Mr. Scarrit6, having resigned from the Government serrice, ~as succeeded by Mr. Howard
as a representati-re of the Department of Commerce at the ninth meeting of the committee.
Most of the meetings were attended also by W. E. M. Ki.ntz, of the Department of Commerce,
and Mr. Starr Truscott, of the ATational Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, and they &Qsisted
the committee in the preparation of this report. In connection with the preparatiort of the
definitions and explanations in-roltig the physiological aspects of aviation Dr. L. EL Bauer,
of the Department of Commerce, and Lieut. Commander John R. Poppen, Medical Corps,
United States Navy, were aIso of assistance.
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FOREIGN COOPERATION
The meeting of May 22, 1928, was attended by the folio-wing representatives of foreign
governments:
Commander Silvio Scaroni, air attach6, Italian Embassy.
Wing Commander T. G. Hetherington, air attach4, British Embassy.
Maj. Georges Thenault, assistant military attachd for aeronautics, French Embassy.
Lieut. Yoshitake Miwa, Imperial Japanese Navy, assistant naval attach6, Japanese
Embassy.
At that-meeting the proposed method of analyzing aircraft accidents was explained and
the value of a uniform system for reporting accidents was discussed. 18 was suggested that
the representatives of the foreign governments consult_ with the personnel in their governments
who were responsible for analyzing and reporting aircraft accidents, regarding the possibility
of adopting the proposed method and form.
Great interest was expressed, and it was the opinion of those present Lhai the adopttion of
a uniform system would be advantageous. The representatives of the foreign governments
were invited to submit comments and suggestions regarding changes, but none had been
received up to the date of the last meeting of the committee. This was probabIy due fio the
necessarily lengthy period of time required for translation, consideration, arid approval.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
DEFINITION OF AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
An aircraft accident-is an occurrence which takes place while an aircraft is being oper~ted
as such and as a rewdt of which a person or persons are injured or killed, or the aircraft receives
appreciable or marked damage through the forces of external contact or through fire. A colli-
sion of two or more aircraft shouId be analyzed and reported statistically as one accident.
IMMEDIATE CAUSES
In the course of its meetings the committee considered various methods of analyzing aircraft
accidents. These included studies and classification by (a) the immediate causes, (b) the under-
lying causes, (c) the nature, and (d) the resulte of the accidents. Each of these methods was
considered in detail, and it was finally found possible to reduce their analysis to the methods
described in this report and combine the results in the form of a single chart.
A plan devised by Lieutenant Philips, of the Army, and Lieutenant Brown, of the Navy,
for the division of the immediate causes of aircraft accidenis into four major classes, and pro-
viding for the further subdivision of these major classes as seemed desirable, together with
proposed definitions of these classes and subdivisions, was submitted to the committee for
consideration.
The outline and definitions of the classification of accidents as presented to the committee
were care ftily considered by the members at a number of meetings, and modifications were
made in the plan as originally drafted so as to provide for evwy type of aircraft accident in the
light of the experience of the members in elassifytig and analyzing accidents in the Government
services.
In working out this outline the committee attempted to provide a p?%n which would permit
of the careful analysis of aircraft accidents by the different organizations from the point of view
of both personnel and matiriel problems. The plan also permits of the analysis of a given
accident into- two or more distinct causes and makes possible, by the use of percentages, the
indication of the relative weight of each cause in any particular accident.
CROSS ANALYSIS
The plan provides for the analysis of crashw according to the nature of the accident (take-off
accidents, tail spins ‘following engine failure, etc. ), the degree of seriousness of personnel injuries,
and the amount of damage occurring to mai%riel.
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Furthermore, the sysiem, through the use of a cross-analysis method, allows for arialyzimg
pilot errors and mat&iel faiIures according to the underlying causes of these errors or failures.
The plan also provides for the analysis of aircraft accidents of different organizations on
the same basis, so that the records wiE be comparable and the preparation of a composite report
of alI aircraft accidents w-M be possible. It is the belief of the committee that if all aircraft
accidents occurring in all agencies are classified in the manner recommended a composite of all
the accidents will off~ a basis upon which a study may be made and correct conclusions
drawn.
A03CRAFT ACCIDENT ANALYSIS FORM
In drawing up the aircraft accident analysis form and the accompanying definitions the
committee had in mind the frequency rate of accidents from the various causes, the logical lines
along which studies should be conducted, and the ease with which these studies can be made
from this chart. Iti is reco_@zed that to make a detailed study of accidents due to any one
cause a further subdivision may be necessary. Eo~ever, if all accidents are classified according
to this chart the major causes can be easiIy determined and further investigation can be readily
carried out for the purpose of eliminating these causes.
It was also recognized, in -working out this chart, that the ditision of immediate causes
between personnel and mat&iel as set forth in the chart and detitions was more or Iess arbi-
trary, since all defects of aircraft can in the last analysis be attributed to errors of personnel,
whether in operation, inspection, maintenance, manufacture, or design. Since the purposes of
the accident. study seemed to be best served by drawing attention to defects of matc%iel, even
though traceable ultimately to personnel errors, the line between personnel and matc%iel in the
immediate causes was drawn at the operating personnel of the aircraft. In other words, under
the main heading “Personnel” there are included only those accidents for which personnel
engaged in operating the aircra.f t are responsible. Accidents due to mat&iel failure are classi-
fied under “Mat&iel” even though personnel charged with design, construction, or operation
may be held responsible for the faihme. Errors due to personnel other than those immediately
accessory to the operation of the aircraft are shown in the “Underlying causes” or “Cross
analysis, ” as set forth hereinafter, rather than in the main headings of immediate causes.
The plan as drawn up by the committee is not in any sense tlnal or complete, but is presented
to provide a working basis for the study of aircrafi accidents from all sowrces.
WEIGHTING OF AC~ENTS
W%ere two or more factors cause an accident., part will be charged to each; for example,
in the case of an avoidable accident following an engine failure the responsibility for the accident
might be considered to be equally divided between the pilot and the power pkmt., in which
case 50 per cent wotid be charged to “l?ersonnel” and 50 per cent to “Mat6riel.” .lf the respon-
sibility for the accident rested largely upon the pilot, “Personnel” would be charged with 60,
70, or 80 per cen~ of the accident, or even more, depending upon the degree of responsibility
decided upon. Conversely in the above cases “ Mat&iel” and “Miscellaneous” would be
charged with a total of 40, 30, or 20 per cent of the accident. This same division of responsibility
might be carried out ~der “persome]” or other subheads. However, ~ the partic~ar case
cited “Errors of piIok” vould be the only division of “Personnel” which could be charged
with this accident. If 80 per cent of the accident were charged to “Personnel” in the above
instance, then 80 per cent of the accident would be charged to “Errors of piIot.” Then, assum-
ing that the responsibility for such piloting error rested jointly upon error of judgment and
poor technique, a still further subdivision -would be made and 40 per cent of an accident would
be charged to “Error of judgment” and 40 per cent to “Poor technique.” Thus the factors
of each crash could be traced down to the last subdivision under any heading and weighted
in accordance with their importance.
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CLASSIFICATION OF ACCIDENTS
For the purpose of comparative study aircraft accidents maybe divided into groups of acci-
dents of the same general characteristics. Accident prevention must be regarded as the primar~
purpose of aircraft skudy. Studies of accident causes point out needed remedies more cIearly
when they are supplemented by certain studies based upon the nature and results of the accident.
For example, in both bad landings and taiI spins the principal cause is usually errors of
the piIot. Statistics based upon the study of causes merely show that pilots’ errors are respon-
sible for more than half of all accidents and the formulation of remedies for the situation appears
difficult. If, however, the same accidents are classified according to their nature and resuIts,
it is found that the taiI spin is the kind of accident that is by far the most prevalent among
those -which produce fatal consequences. It is apparent that new designs which decrease the
tendency of airplanes to spin, or new training methods which increase the ability of pilots
to avoid falling into spins and to recover from them qticldy, fi have a marked influence
toward the prevention of fatal accidents.
Like-wise, the study based upon nature and results indicates, in the ease of collisions, that
this kind of accident is third in importance among those which produce fatal results, and that
these accidents are much more prevsdent during winter months than in summer; and -while
remedies are not so obtious as in the case of taiI spins some lines of attack immediately suggest
themsel~es.
The following c1assi6cations for study of accidents according to their nature are recom-
mended:
1.XATUREOF THE ACCIDENT
This consists of dividing accidents into separate chtsses according to the type of accident
which OCCUI’S.
1. Class A—Collisions in jult jiiglit with other aircrajt.—This includes al collisions with
airplanes, balIoons, or other aircraft while the collkling aircraft is at flying speed or
at an altitude which permits free maneuvering. It includes collisions (1) on the
ground while taxying, taking off, or landing, and (2) in the air immediately before
landing or after taking off and whiIe the airpIane is at or near its minimum flying speed.
2. (?lass B— Collisions in jull$iglit with ob].ect~ other than aircrajt.-This includes collisions
whiIe at flying speed and -with power plant functioning normally with trees, poIes,
houses, mountain sides, or other obstacles. It includes collisions with the earth or
water by diving. It excludes collisions (1) on the ground whiIe tax-ying, taking off,
or landing, and (2) in the air immediately before landing or after taking of??and wide
the airplane is at or near its minimum flying speed.
3. (?latw C—Tail .spinsJo170wing engine failure.—This includes spins, stalk, and all collisions
with the earth while the airphme is out of cordrol due to loss of flying speed following
engine failure.
4. C7a.ssD— Tail spins without enp”ne jailure.-This includes spire, stalls, and alI collisions
with the earth -while the airplane is out of control following loss of flying speed, with
the engine functioning norndy. It includes spins due to structural failure or defective
handling qu~ties of the airplane.
5. Class E—Forced lancZings.-This cowrs accidents -while making kdings necessitated by
conditions -which couId not be overcome -ivhile in flight. Such conditions include
engine trouble and other defects of the aircraft, loss of knowledge of the direction to ~he
destination or the location on the map of the aircraft’s position, bad weather, darkness,
and exhaustion of fuel.
6. Class F—Landing accidents.—This includes accidents while the pilot is in the act of
executing a volumtary landing. It does not @clude forced landings or accidents while
examining a field from the air or approaching it for a birding.
7. G7ass G—Take-o@ acci&nts.—This includes accidents occurring between the time of
starting a take-off to the time when full flying speed is gained, except those covered
under other c.lassiflcations, as, for instance, tail spins or forced landings.
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8. (7k.ss H—Taxying accidents. —This includes all accidents which occur whiI~ the air-
craft is maneuvering under its own power on land ox water. It excludes accidents
while the aircraft- is still moving after a landing or whiIe it is getting up speed for a
take-off.
9. (lass I—Fires in the air. —This includes all accidents in which fire breaks out, either as
a cause or result of the occurrence, while the aircraft is in flight.
10. CZatw J— Carrier, platform, and arresting-gear accidents .-This includes accidents
occurring while the aircraft is landing upon or taking off from (1) the deck of a float-
ing aircraft carrier, or (2) an elevated platform intended for the landing and taking
off of aircraft, but excludes launching-gear accidents.
11. (?Zass E—Launc7ting. gear accidents. —This includes accidents during take-off in which
the aircraft is assisted in gaining flying speed by the application of an external force.
12. (llass L—Miscellaneous.—This includes accidents the nature of which is known but
which do not faII into one of the above classifications.
13. (?lass M-In..determinate and dou6@l.-This includes all accidents concerning the
nature of which so little is known that any classification can not be intelligently
accomplished.
IL INJURY TO PERSONNEL
This consists of dividing accidents into separate classes according to the injury suffered by
personnel in such aircraft.
1. C??atwA.—A “Class A“ injury is one resulting in the death of the individual within a
period of 90 days.
2, G’lass B.—A “(lass B” injury is one resulting in serious injury to the individual.
Because of the difficulties of classification, the opinion-of a physician should be obtained
whenever possible as to whether an injury is severe or minor. When a physician is
not avaiIable, the foIlowing general rules should be follo-wed: Any inj my that results
in unconsciousness; any fracture of any bone except simple fractures of the fingers
and toes; lacerations that involve muscles -or cause severe hemorrhage; any injury
to any internal organ; or any other injury that it seems probable will incapacitate
tihe individual for more than five days should be classed as a severe injury. All
other injuries should be classed as minor.
3. G7assC.—A “Class C” injury is one resulting in only minor injury to the individual.
4. &lass D.—Any personnel who experience an aviation accident with no personal injury
shall be classified as “Class D.”
NOTE.—The classification of an accident according to-injury to personnel shall contain
a letter for each individual in the aircraft at the time of the accident, the first of these letters
representing the pilot of the aircraft. For example, in an accident where the pilot is
killed, one passenger seriously injured, and the remaining passenger escapes with only
minor injury the accident would be c~assifkd as a Class ABC accident. Had the pilot
escaped with minor injury and both passengers been killed, it would have been a Class
CAA accident,
111.DA&lAGETO MAT6R1EL
This consists of dividing accidents into- separate classes according to the amount of damage
which occurs to maix%iel.
1. OZass A .—This includes all accidents as a resuIt of which the aircraft is of no further
value except for salvage of usable parts.
2. Oi!ass B.—This includes all accidents as a result of which it is necessary to completely
overhaul the aircraft before it-would be again airworthy.
3. (?lass C.—This includes all accidents as a result of which it is necessary to replace some
major assembly of the aircraft before it would be again airworthy, such as a wing,
fuselage, undercarriage, tail, or engine. Accidents in which the damage to the engine
or other major assembly was a cause and. not a result are excluded from this category
unless the remaining damage warrants such.
.
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4. 07a.ss D.—This incIudes SE incidents which because of other factors come within tlm
category of an aircraft accidenk and as a resu.It of which there is only minor and easily
repairable damage to the aircraft., such as a broken tail skid, wheel, bent propeller
tip, etc.
5. Cl’ass E’.-This includes au incidents similar to Class D accidents above in which there
is no damage to mat.6riel.
6. Class F.—’’Class F” is iduded in this analysis only because of the interest it may
have for the different organizations which may use this method of analyzing. It con-
sists of mat&iel failures which did not resuIt in an accident, and, strictly speaking,
does not actually fit into an accident analysis. However, the methods here used for
analyzing mat6riel faiIures which did result in accidents can as easily be applied to
those which did not, and thus afford a method of studying the potential accidents,
which because of other reasons did not occur, such as a successful landing after engine
failure, etc.
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS
—
The following classifications for study of aircraft accidents according to their causes are
recommended:
A L\l?IXED1~TECA~Sl13OFriEICEAFTACCIDEW’FS
The 9oIIowing is a proposed Iist of immediate standard causes of aircraft accidents, with
definitions where considered necessary for clarity.
I. Personnel.—This includes aIl accidents which can be traced to persons accessory to the
operation of the aircraft., either on the ground or in the air. This does not idude - ___
accidents due to errors or omissions of personnel charged with the design, manufacture,
maintenance, or inspection of aircraft.
1. ERRORS OF PILOT.-Thk includes all accidents the responsibility for which
rests upon the pilot. The pilot is the actual manipulator of the controk or
the indi-ridual responsible for their correcb manipulation.
(a) ERROR OF JUDGMENT.-ThiS includes all accidents resulting from a
decision made by the piIob which was not the best possible under
existing circumstances.
(b) POOR TECHNIQUE.—ThiS incIudes all accidents restiting from lack
of skill, dexterity, or coordination of the senses in handling air-
craft codtrols, whether traceab~e to inherent inability to attain
such or to infrequent flying, lack of experience in flying, lack of.
experience in frying under particular conditions, or in the particular
type of aircraft.
(c) DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS.—ThiS includes all accidents resulting
from the violation or disobedience of local or general orders or
regulations or provisions of law go~erning the operation of air-
craft, such as low acrobatics, acrobatics in aircraft not to be used
for such purposes, or any other type or manner of operation spe-
cifically forbidden by orders or regulations issued by competent
authorities.
(d) CARELESSNESS OR ~EGLIGENCE.—ThiS includes all accidents resulting
from the absence of care on the part of the pilot according to circum-
stances or the failure to use that degree of care which the circum-
stances justly demand, either on the ground or in the air, such as
carekss manipulation of the controls of an aircraft., f a.ilure to ascer-
tain the amount of gasoIine on board before taking off, faiIure to
ascert~ the condi~io~ of the ~s~rments, etc.
(e) JfISCELLA.NEOUS.-TtiS includes all accidents restit.ing from errors of
the piIot not accounted for above.
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I. Pensonnel.—Continued.
2. ERRORS OF SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL.—This includes all accidents .
the responsibility for which rests upon individual. other than the pilot who
exercise control over the operation of the aircra.ft, such as navigators, forma-
tion sectiou leaders, ground-operations oflkers, etc.
3. ERRORS OF OTHER PERSONNEL.—This includes W accidents the respon-
sibility for which rests upon other personnel directly concerned with the
operation of the aircraft, such as members of the flight and ground crews of
the aircraft, aerographers, etc.
11. .lfat4%l.—This includes all accidents resulting from failures of the airplane, power
plant, accessories, and launching and arresting devices, whether traceable to materitils,
faulty design, maintenance, or inspection.
1. POV7ER-PLA.NTT FAILURE .—This includes all accidents resulting from failure
or malfunctioning of the propelling system and all auxiliaries essential to its
proper funcfiioning, exclusive of instruments.
(a) FUEL SYSTEM.
(~) COOLING SYSTi?M.
(c) IGNITION SYSTEM.
(cl) LUBRICATION SYSTEM.
(e) ENGINE STRUCTURE.
.
(f) PROpELLER 4JND PROP~LL~R-ACXXSSORIM,
(g) ENGINE CONTROL SYSTEM (THROTTLE ROD, ETC.).
(h) MISCELLANEOUS.
(i) UNDETERMINED.
2. STRUCTURAL FAILURE.—This includes all accidents resulting from failures
of the airplane exclusive of the propelling system and instruments,
(a) FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM.
(6) MOVABLE SURFACES. .:-
(c) STABILIZING SURFACES.
. .
(d) WINGS, STRIJTS, AND BRACING.
(e) LANDING Gmm.-This includes all accidents resdting from fafiure of
the landing-gear struts and shock-absorbing gear, but does not
include accidents resulting from f aiIure of the wheels or floats %3J. . —
attached thereto.
(f) WHEELS, TIRES, AND BRAKES.
(g) SEAPLANE FLOAT OR BOAT.
(h) FUSELAGE, ENGINE MOUNT, AND FITTINGS,
(;) TAIL SKID OR WHEEL ASSEMBLY.
~) ARRESTING APPLIANCES ON AIRCRAFT,
(2) MISCELLANEOUS.
(z) UNDETRRMIN~D.
3. HANTDLIhTG QUALITIES.—Thk includes all accidents resulting from those
peculiar characteristics of certain types of aircraft affecting their co~trolla-
bility while on the ground or in the air, such as marked tendency to ground
loop, inability- to recover from a spin, etc.
4. IhTSTRUMENTS.-This includes all accidents resulting from failures of instru-
ments which were essential to operation under the conditions of the flight.
5. LAUNCHING DEVICES .—This inclsldes all accidents resulting from failure
or malfunctioning of catapults.
6. ARRESTING DEVICES .—This includes all accidents resulting from failure
or malfunctioning of arresting gear not a part of the aircraft.
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111. Xisce77aneows.-This includes all accidents noi accounted for above but. those causes
Bre cIeterminecl.
1. ‘iVEATHER.-This includes all accidents resuIting from conditions of the
weather -which could not reasonably ha~e been foreseen and avoided. (Men-
tion may be made on the charti of contributing weather causes, as fog, gaIe,
ice, hail, snow, rain, lightning, etc.)
2. DAR KNESS.-This irdudes alI accidents resulting from conditions due to
nightfaIl which could noi reasonably have been foreseen and avoided.
3. AIRPORT OR TERRAILT.—This includes alI accidents resulting from air-
ports or Ianding conditions of places which couId not reasonably have been
detected or avoided. (Forced landings should be charged to power plant,
etc., unless report shows thtit safe landing could have been made, in which
case the crash ~o~d probab]y be attributed to error of judgment or poor
technique.)
4. OTEER .—This includes alI accidents resulting from causes not otherwise
accounted for above.
11’. lldeterrnined and dou7@.-This includes aIl accidents the causes of which are either
undetermined or doubtful.
B.UNDERLYINGCAUSES OF AIRCRAFT ACCTDEN-TS
The following is a list of standard underlying causes of aircraft accidents, ~<th definitions
where considered necessary for clarity.
1. Errors of pilot. -Returning to “Errors of pilot,” paragraph I, subparagraph 1, above,
the subdivisions of this paragraph were made according to the immediate causes of
the errors attributed to the pdot, such as an “Error of judgment,” “Poor technique, ”
etc. The underlying causes of such errors may frequently be of more interest than
the actual causes themselves. These causes may be defined as those elements which
contributed to the pilot’s mental and physical equipmenli at the time of the accident
or to the deficiencies which esisted in such equipment.
1. LACK OF EXPERIEA~CE.-This includes aLl accidents resulting from insuffi-
cient personaI acquaintance with the actual conditions which had to be met
under the circumsta~ces.
(a) LACK OF GE~ER~L EXPERIE~CE.—ThiS incIudes aJ-I accidents .
rew.dting from a lack of experience in the generaI problems of
aviation, such as landing, taking off, air work, etc.
(1) LACK OF TOTAL GENERAL EXPEFUE~CE.—ThiS includes all
accidents resulting from a lack of general experience due
to the fact that the individual concerned has neyer engaged
in such work for a sufficient period of time to acquire the
necessary experience to ha~e avoided such accidents.
@) L~GK OF P,EcE~~ GE~~R.4L EXPERIENCE.—ThiS includes all
accidents resulting from a lack of general ability due to
the fact that the individual concerned has too infrequently
engaged in genera.I flying activities prior to the accident,
and consequently lost the ability he had originally acquired.
[h LACK OF SPECIAL 13XPERIEXCE.-ThiS includes all accidents resul t-
ing from a lack of qerience b special problems of aviation,
such as certain features of cross-comtry flying (which might for
example, require an intimate knowledge of the terrain of a certain
section)l carrier operations, night fl-j-ingl blind flying, etc.
(1) LACK OF TOTAL SPECIAL KXP~RIEXCE.—ThiS includes all
accidents resulting from a lack of special experience due to
the fact thak the individual had never engaged in such
special problems for a sufficient period of time to acquire
the necessary experience to have a~oided such accidents.
4TJ9&—2$—-”-
.> I
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1. Error~ qf pilot—C?ontinued.
1. LACK OF E~PERIEhTCE—Continued.
(b) L.Ac~ OF SPECIAL EXPERIE~CE—COnthlUed.
(2) LACK OF RECENT SPECIAL ExPEluE~c~.—This includes all
accidents resulting from a lack of ability in the special
problems due to the fact that the individual concerned has
too infrequently engaged in special flying activities prior
to the accident, and consequently lost the ability he had
originally acquired.
2. PHYSICAL ANTD”PSYCHOLOGICAL-CAUSES.-This includes all aeriden k
resulting from a demonstrable disease or defect or poor reaction.
(a) DISEASE OR lh?~cT.—This includes all accidents result.ing from a
disease or defect, demonstrable by physical (including nervous
systqm) examination.
(1) INHERENT DISEASE OR DmwcT.-This includes a]] accidents
resulting from a disease or defect which is not susceptible
to remedy within a reasonable period of time, such as over-
shooting a field, faulty lanclings or collision because of
defective vision or judgment of distance; unconsciousness;
hyste~ical or epileptic tendency; chronic air sickness; inabil-
ity to withstand altitude, etc. The history of an individual
may often be necessary to determine if a disease or defect
is inherent.
(2) TEMPORARY DISIZASE OR DllFlzcT.-This includes a]] accidents
resulting from a disease or defcc t. ~vhirh is remediable and
one which may not be expected to repeat itself with unduo
frequency in the individual concerned, such RS fatigue,
either mental or muscula.r, staleness, temporary illness,
incomplete convalescence, etc.
(L) POOR RI? ACTION.-ThiS includes a]] accidents which result from no
demonstrable disease or defect but from psychological causes,
making the individual react either erroneously or slowly to a
situation, such as selecting what is manifestly the poorer of two
fields for an emergency landing, persisting on a course. when
better judgment would indicate that he should land or turn back,
indulging in acrobatics over prohibited areas or at too low altitude,
etc.
(1) PooR REACTION, INHJ3RENT.-This includes all accidents resulti-
ng from psychological causes which apparently are not
susceptible to correction within a reasonable peiiod of
time. The history of the individual would be a very
important adjunct in determining if such poor reaction were
inherent and its repetition to be frequently expected.
(2) POOR REACTION, ‘rmwoR.4Rl-.-This includes all acciden k re-
sulting from psychological causes which apparently are
subject to correction, disciplinary or other~sise, within a
reasonable period of time.
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11. Watt%iel failures.—The underlaying causes of ‘(mat&iel failures” should also prove of
considerable interest in ansdyzhg accidents.
1. F~T.ILTl’ INTSTRllCTIOhTS.-This includes all accidents resuIting from
mat&ieI fafiures which were traceable to errors or omissions in the standard
instructions covering the use of such mat&ieI.
(a) FAULTY OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS.—ThiS includes all accidents
resuIting from mat&iel f adures which were traceable to the opera-
tion of such rnat&iel in accordance with standard instructions
which prove to be incorrect or i~comp}ete7 such as instructions
governing the use of the mkture control which when carried out
are found to damage the engine, instructions governing the proper
engine operating temperature which when carried out are found
to damage the engine, etc.
(3 j FAULTY klAINTEN&WCE INSTRUCTIONS.-ThiS includes all accidents
resulting from mzt&iel fahres which were traceable to the main-
tenance of such rnat&iel in accordance with standard instructions
which prove to be incorrect or incomplete, such as instructions
governing the type of protective coating to co-rer duralumin
parts -when operating as a seaplane, etc.
2. F.lIJLTl’ IhTSPE CTIO&T.—This includes all accidents resulting from mat~riel
failures which were traceable to errors or omissions in the inspection of such
mat&ieI.
(a) FAULTY NIANUFACTURING InSpeCtiOn .—This includes dl accidents
traceable to faulty inspection of mat&iel where such errors or omis-
sions occurred prior to the receipt of this mat&iel by the consumer.
(b) FAULTY OVERHAUL INSPECTION.—ThiS includes all accidents trace-
able to fauIty inspection of mat&ieI where such errors or omissions
occurred during overhaul or storage of the mat&iel.
(c) FAULTY JfAINTENANcE INSPEC~IOX.—ThiS includes al accidents
traceable to faulty inspection of mat&ieI where such errors or omis-
sions in inspection occurred after the finaI deIivery of this mat&iel
to the operating unit.
(d) FAULTY lNSPECTIOXl ~XDETERMINATE.-This incIudes au accidents
traceable to faulty inspection of mat&iel where actual responsibility
for the errors or omissions in inspection can not be defkitely placed.
3. F~ULTl” JIATERIX..S.-This includes all accidents resulting from mat&iel
failures which were traceable to defective materials when such defects in
materials could not reasonably have been detected and eliminated by a
proper system of inspection.
(a) ORIGINALLY DEFEC~WE ~fATERIALs.—This incIudes au accidents
traceabIe to faulty materials where the materiak contained such
defects when originally delivered.
(6) DETERIORATED 3fATERIAH.—ThiS includes all accidents traceable to
faulty materials where the defects of such materials occurred
through deterioration after deLivery.
(c) FAULTY llATERIALS, INDETERMINATE.—ThiS includes all accidents
traceable to fauIty materials where it is not possible to determine
the actual time or place when such defects first appeared.
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II. Material .jailures.-C!ontinuecl.
4. FAULTY DESIGAT.—This includes sJ1accidents resulting from rnattriel ffiilures
which were traceable to errors or omissions in the original design of such
rnat&iel.
(a) FAULTY DESI~~, Omm~&.-This includes a]] accidents traceable to
faulty design where such errors or omissions in design occurred in
the original design of such mat6riel, or in the course of changes
initiated or directed by persons having recognized authority regarci-
ing design or construction.
(1) FAULTY ORIGINALDESI~~, STRUCTURALSTRENGTH.
(2) FAULTY ORrGINALDEslGN, ARRANGE&lENT.
(3) FAULTY ORIGINALDESIGN, AERODYNAMIC.
(4) FAULTY ORIGINALDESIGN, IiVDETERMI~ATE.
(b) FAULTY DESIGN, MODIF1~ATION.-ThiS includes a]l accidents traceable
to faulty design where such errors or omissions in design occurred
in modifications to the original design of such mat&iel initiated or
directed by persons not having recognized authority regarding de-
sign or construction (such as jury rigs, emergency repairs, etc.).
5. INDETERMINATE MATERIEL FAILURE.-This includes all accidents
from mat&iel failures the exact source of which can not be determined.
DESCRIPTION AND TYPICAL ANALYSIS OF AN ACGIDENT
Pilot John Doe was flying in a seaplane at 200 feet altitude over a point of land between
a hay and the open sea when the engine stopped. Pilot Doe had an opportunity to land either
directly into the wind in the open sea or cross wind in the bay. He started to land in the ocean,
but at 100 feet- altitude he changed his mind and attempted to turn so as to land in the btiy.
In turning, Do{ held the nose of the seaplane up, stalled
it, and spun into the land. The seaplane was demolished,
the pilot was seriously injured, and the passengei was
—
killed.
Doe, according to- his record, was an experienced
aviator with 30 hours’ flyigg during the preceding month
and with recent expwience in stunting seaplanes.
Examination of the engine showed that one of
the teeth in the magneto timing gear had stripped} the
broken tooth having been drawn into the other teeth,
causing the eventual stripping of all teeth. The original break was determined to be a visible
hardening crack.
The NATURE of this accident is Class C—Tail spin following engine failure, as defined
on page 9. The classification according to RESULTSis Personnel, (lass BA (p. 10); Mat&ie12
Class A.
In analyzing this accident the IMMEDIATE CAUSE is charged, as indicated On the analysis
chart, as 75 per cent “Personnel” and 2.5 per cent “ ?datkriel, ” for the reason that the twount
of the accident shows that the pilot had two chances to make a safe Ianding and todi advantag~
of neither of them. Considering the 75 per cent which is charged to “ Pwsonnel,” i.t is obvious
that this is chargeable neither to “Errors of supervisory personnei” nor to “Errors of other
personnel,” so that the whole weightj 75 per cent, must be placed under “Errors of pilot. ”
It appears further that the errors of the pilot involved errors of judgment in that he lost altitude
while wavering indecisively between landing in the ocean and attempting to land in the bay.
It appears that poor techni~ue was the most important single factor in that he continued to
pull the nose up, still further stalling the seaplane, when he should have sensed the approaching
stall. It is considered that a charge of 35 per cent to “Error of judgment” and 40 per cent
to “Poor technique” represents as near an approximation as can be arrived at in this case.
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On analysis of UIVDERL~I~GCAUSESit-would appear that the “Error of judgment” and “ Poor
technique” were both due to a ‘(Temporary poor reaction “ with a strong possibility of such
“Poor reaction” being “Inherent” rather than “ Tern”porary. ” However, in the absence of a
history of the individual this would have to be classified as “Temporary.”
Considering the 25 per cent charged to “11. .Mat&iel,” the entire 25 per cent obviously
should be assigned to “ 1. Power-plant failure, ” in the second order of subdivision, and again
in the third order of subdivision the entire 25 per cent should be charged to ‘c (c) Igni~ion
system. ”
The underlying cause of this mat6rie1 fai~ure is unquestionably faulty manufacturing
and accordingly on the cross analysis it would be placed under the head of “Manufacturing
inspection. ”
~ONCLUSION AND RECOMIWENDATIONS
The special committee on the nomenclature, subdivision, and classification of aircraft
accidents, having studied in considerable detail the problem of classifying and analyzing the
causes of aircraft accidents, at its final meeting held on July 17, 1928, unanimously adopted a
resolution approving thk report and recommending that it be published by the Natio~al Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics and that copies be transmitted to the War, Navy, and Commerce
Departments with a recommendation that the proposed method of analysis of aircraft accidcmts
outlined in the report be adopted for use in their respecti~e services. The special committee
recommends further that copies of the report be transmitted also to the appropriate representa-
tives of the various interested foreign governments with a request that they cooperate by con-
tributing information from time to time in relation to aircraft accidents.
With the submission of this report the work of the special committee is concluded and it
should be discharged. It is probable, however, that the introduction of the proposed char~
for the analysis of accidents will result in questions as to interpretation and suggestions for
changes, many of which, it is believed, have been considered during the meetings of the committee.
It is also probable that study of the information obtained from the application of the method of
analysis will indicate that certain features in aircraft construction or operation should be given
more detailed study or consideration. The committee therefore at its final meeting adopted a
resolution recomme~ding that its present personnel be reorganized into a standing committee
on aircraft accidents of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics for the purpose of
considering from time to time such new matter regarding aircraft accidents as may appear
desirable or as maybe brought before it.
Respectfully submitted.
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE hToMENcLA!ruRE, SUBDIVISION,
AND (CLASSIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS.
GEORGE K. BURGESS, Chairman.
WASHINGTON) D. C., Auqwst i5, 1928.
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